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As firms grow older, their profitability seems to decline.  We 
first document this phenomenon and show that it is very 
robust.  Then we offer two non-exclusive explanations of 
why firms may age.  First, corporate aging could reflect a 
cementation of organizational rigidities over time.  Consistent 
with that, costs rise, growth slows, assets become obsolete, 
and investment and R&D activities decline.  Second, older 
age could advance the diffusion of rent-seeking behavior 
inside the firm.  This hypothesis is supported by the poorer 
governance, larger boards, and higher CEO pay we observe 
in older firms.  Overall, firms seem to face a real senescence 
problem. 
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1. Introduction 
In biology, aging is a process associated with a general decline in the physical functioning of the 
human body, such as the ability to remember, react, move, and hear.  We want to know whether 
firms also weaken and lose their ability to compete over time, and we want to know why that 
happens.  The first part of the paper documents a steady profitability decay as firms get older.  
The second part then examines the possible economics of that phenomenon and offers two not 
mutually exclusive rationales, namely organizational rigidities and rent-seeking behavior.   
Whereas the quest for organizational immortality has attracted considerable attention in the 
management, the organization, and the industrial organization literatures (Stinchcombe, 1965; 
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989; Singh and Lumsden, 1990; Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990; 
Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Hannan, 1998, Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2003a, b), 
economists have generally paid comparatively little attention to the issue of the actual 
performance of older firms (Caves, 1998).  This paper wants to contribute closing that gap. 
Since firms are organizations that can be restructured as needs evolve, there is no a priori 
reason why they should age.  In fact, as they mature, firms should be able to learn.  They can 
learn by doing or by investing in research and development; they can hire human capital and 
train their employees; and they can learn from other firms in the same and in other industries 
(see, for example, Bahk and Gort, 1993, and the vast literature cited therein).  Over time, firms 
should also discover what they are good at (Jovanovic, 1982).  Consistent with this prior belief, 
various studies in the industrial organization literature report that life expectancy increases with 
age (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989), and better firms survive (Baker and Kennedy, 
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2002).    Hopenhayn (1992) shows that, under plausible assumptions, older firms enjoy higher 
profits and value.   
As mentioned above, this study begins with an examination of the relation between age and 
profitability.  We study 10,930 listed firms with data on CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and 
COMPUSTAT Industry Segment between 1978 and 2004 (82,845 firm-years).  We show that 
getting older is associated with lower profitability.  Profit margins, return on assets, and Tobin’s 
Q ratios fall.  This pattern holds across different time periods, for different measures of age, for 
different industry definitions, and for different firm samples.  This regularity is robust to a 
battery of alternative estimation techniques and specifications.  Moreover, it is distinct from such 
phenomena as sample selection, concave investment opportunity sets, financial frictions (Cooley 
and Quadrini, 2001; Clementi, 2002), declining investor uncertainty (Pástor and Veronesi, 2003), 
increasing diversification (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004), post-IPO regularities 
(Jain and Kini, 2004; Fama and French, 2004), declining ownership concentration (Holderness, 
Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999; Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz, 2007; Holderness, 2009), older 
management (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Faleye, 2007), and aging industry.  Firm aging 
does not seem to be driven by family firms either (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006).1   
Why would firms age?  In the second part of the paper, we propose two nonexclusive 
explanations for that possible phenomenon, namely organizational rigidities (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Leonard-Barton, 1992) and rent-seeking behavior (Olson, 1982; Bertrand and 
                                                 
1  Firm age also appears as a control variable in various empirical finance studies.  For example, it is a control 
variable in default forecast models (Shumway, 2001) and in takeover prediction models (such as 
Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, and Kattuman, 2009).  It is also used to measure increasing complexity of 
operations (see, among others, Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008).  
Our results suggest that firm age is more than a proxy for unspecified relations.  
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Mullainathan, 2003).  Organizational rigidities can come about because success induces firms to 
codify their approach through organization and processes.  This regulation can become capillary 
over time.  This behavior seems increasingly to entangle firms in structural and process-related 
rigidities that are difficult to discard (Leonard-Barton, 1992) and that could cause companies to 
succumb to Schumpeter’s “perennial gale of creative destruction.”  We refer to this hypothesis as 
organizational rigidity hypothesis.  It could also be that older firms are incapable of solving 
collective action problems.  As in the case of nations (Olson, 1982), firms might increasingly 
become organizations of rent-seeking factions as they get older.  Rent seeking can take the form 
of the pursuit of a quieter life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003).   
Consistent with the existence of organizational rigidities, we find that older firms are less 
efficient compared to their industry peers, as manifested in higher costs, slower growth, older 
assets, and reduced R&D and investment activities.  We also observe a progressive degeneration 
of corporate governance quality, larger boards, and higher CEO compensation, which is 
consistent with the inability to solve collective action problems.     
Some studies have proposed a life-cycle theory of the firm.  Biological arguments in 
economics go back at least to Marshall’s “trees in the forest” analogy.  A life-cycle argument, for 
example, has been offered to explain dividend payments (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006) and financing decisions (Berger and Udell, 1990).  In these papers, 
however, life cycles are defined based on specific patterns in firm profitability, investment 
opportunities, and size, not age per se.  According to our results, age itself could define the 
firm’s life cycle. 
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To the best of our knowledge, ours is one of the first large-scale studies to address the 
corporate aging phenomenon, at least in terms of its performance aspects (Agarwal and Gort, 
1996, 2002, examine survival), and the first such study to document that aging exasperates 
organizational rigidities and fosters rent-seeking behavior.  It is also the first study to show that, 
when investigating profitability or growth, corporate age is not simply a proxy for other variables 
or a generic control variable, but a genuine phenomenon separate, for example, from 
management age and industry age.  Corporate geriatrics problems are real.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the approach to measuring the 
correlation between firm age and profitability.  Section 3 discusses the data.  Section 4 
documents a negative relation between firm age and profitability.  Section 5 examines the 
robustness of that relation.   Section 6 interprets the results within the context of our two aging 
hypotheses.  Section 7 explores a number of alternative interpretations implied by the literature 
or suggested by economic logic.  Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Firm age and profitability: the investigative design 
In studying the relation between firm age and profitability, we want to differentiate that possible 
influence from a number of obvious spurious relations implied by previous articles.  In Cooley 
and Quadrini (2001), for example, financial constraints prevent firms from raising all the funds 
necessary for the marginal product of capital to equal its opportunity cost.  Consequently, as 
capital increases over time, its marginal product declines, and so does the firm’s rate of growth.  
Clementi (2002) proposes a model that combines the industrial organization literature on firm 
dynamics and the corporate finance literature on IPOs.  He embeds the IPO decision in a 
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dynamic optimization model similar to that in Cooley and Quadrini (2001).  The model is able to 
predict the post-IPO decline in operating return on assets documented in Jain and Kini (1994).  
According to this strand of the literature, age could be related to profitability because of financial 
frictions.   
The finance literature has also looked at age-related profitability issues, although from 
different angles than ours.  Pástor and Veronesi (2003) propose a risk argument.  According to 
this view, investors’ uncertainty lessens as the firm grows older (see also related arguments in 
James and Wier, 1990; Berger and Udell, 1990).  Consistent with that, the variability of stock 
returns is negatively related with incorporation age (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) and 
with listing age (Cheng, 2008).  Declining risk implies declining required rates of return.  Hence, 
profitability could appear to deteriorate with age when in fact the driving factor is declining 
uncertainty.   
Other finance papers have uncovered an inverse relation between age and ownership 
concentration (Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999; Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz, 2007; 
Holderness, 2009).  In principle, if ownership were positively related to profitability, this 
regularity could induce a spurious negative relation between age and profitability.  A spurious 
relation could also be induced by the age and tenure of the managers within the organization 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2008).  Finally, a relation between 
age and profitability is suggested by the diversification literature, too.  Over time, the reasoning 
goes, as their original industries mature, firms may be forced to enter new industries.  But 
unrelated, or conglomerate, diversification harms profitability (see, among others, Campa and 
Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004).  Age could therefore correlate with diversification, and thereby 
indirectly with profitability.  
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These considerations, taking into account additional control variables that have been 
suggested in the literature, imply a relation between firm profitability and age of the following 
form: 
Profitability = f(age, financial frictions, management age, management tenure, ownership 
structure, risk, focus, size, capital expenditures) 
We will estimate this relation with regression analysis.  We hypothesize a negative, 
possibly nonlinear relation between age and profitability.  The initial specification we choose is a 
quadratic function.  We will switch to alternative specifications in the empirical section.     
The remaining variables should have coefficients with the following signs.  Financial 
frictions should impair profitability (Clementi, 2002; Cooley and Quadrini, 2001).  The same is 
true for management age and tenure.  Moreover, firms with concentrated ownership should have 
a better handle on agency problems with managers and therefore perform better.  The coefficient 
of risk depends on the profitability measure we use.  As explained later, we work with gross 
profit margins, returns on assets (ROA), and Tobin’s Q ratios.  Margins and ROAs should 
correlate positively with risk (high risk, high return).  The risk coefficient of Tobin’s Q, 
however, should be zero in a cross section, since Tobin’s Q is a risk-adjusted measure of 
performance.  In addition to that, more focused firms should be more profitable.  Furthermore, 
profitability should be negatively related to firm size (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001)  Finally, the 
sign of capital expenditures cannot be assessed a priori (see, however, McConnell and 
Muscarella, 1985).  Firms that invest a lot may capture profitable growth opportunities and be 
able to stem obsolescence, but they may also throw good money after bad. 
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3. Data 
3.1. Sample description 
The sample consists of all listed firms with data on CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and COMPUSTAT 
Industry Segment between 1978 and 2004.  Following Berger and Ofek (1995), among others, 
we exclude firm-years with total sales of less than USD 20 million, firm-years with missing 
values for total assets, and firm-years for which the sum of segment sales deviates from total 
sales by more than 1 percent.  Unlike other studies, however, ours includes firms with business 
segments in the financial sector (SIC 6000–6999).  The final sample consists of 10,930 firms and 
82,845 firm-years, including 1,669 financials (6,644 firm-years). 
We start with 2,285 firms in 1978 and end with 2,923 firms in 2004.  Turnover is 
remarkably high: 8,654 firms enter and 7,896 firms leave between 1978 and 2004.  Some of the 
firms that drop from the exchange may list again years later, for example in a reverse LBO.  In 
our approach, we treat them as separate firms.  According to Fama and French (2004), only 145 
firms go public between 1973 and 2001 after having gone private.  We come back to this 
potential sample-selection problem in the empirical analysis. 
 
3.2. Firm age 
We define firms as the corporations observed in practice.  Our measures of age, therefore, refer 
to the age of these legal entities.  One could object that legal entities do not necessarily 
correspond to what an economist would regard as firms.  We acknowledge that problem.  Still, 
our results apply to firms as typically defined and researched in the literature.     
page 9 
 
Shumway (2001) claims that the economically most meaningful measure of firm age is the 
number of years since listing.  That event is a defining moment in a company’s life.  Not 
surprisingly, listing affects ownership and capital structure, multiplies growth opportunities, 
increases media exposure, and demands different corporate governance structures (Loderer and 
Waelchli, 2010).  Most studies that look at firm age, including Shumway (2001), Pástor and 
Veronesi (2003), Fama and French (2004), and Chun et al. (2008), measure age in the same way.  
Firm age is therefore the number of years (plus one) elapsed since the year of the 
company’s IPO.2  We refer to this variable as the firm’s listing age.  We add one year to avoid 
ages of zero.  The information is from CRSP.  Since CRSP goes back to 1925, the oldest a firm 
can be at the beginning of our sample period in 1978 is 54 years, compared with 80 years at the 
end of it, in 2004.  For a random subsample of 5,000 firms, we also compute the number of years 
(plus one) elapsed since the year of incorporation and denote this variable as the firm’s 
incorporation age.  The information is hand-collected from Mergent Webreports.   
Measuring age is not always straightforward, especially in the presence of mergers.  Take 
the case of the AOL Time Warner deal in 2000.  One could assign the resulting firm a listing age 
that starts in 2000, in 1992 (the CRSP inclusion date for AOL), or in 1964 (the CRSP inclusion 
date for Time Warner).  In keeping with the literature, we go with the date suggested by CRSP, 
namely the year 2000.  We come back to this problem further down and show that it does not 
seem to affect our results. 
                                                 
2  More precisely, we approximate a firm’s year of birth with the earliest of: (a) the year in which the firm 
appears on CRSP; (b) the year in which the firm is included in COMPUSTAT; and (c) the year for which we 
find a link between CRSP and COMPUSTAT (based on COMPUSTAT data item LINKDT). If, for example, 
a firm enters CRSP or COMPUSTAT in 1996, its age is one year at the end of 1996 (1+1996-1996) and five 
years at the end of 2000 (1+2000-1996). 
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On average, listing age is 14 years; the median is 10 (Panel A of Table 1).  The distribution 
of firm age remains fairly stable over the sample period, except in the late 1990s, when the 
median drops to 7, possibly as a result of the dot-com IPO wave.  Panel B reports descriptive 
statistics for incorporation age.  The median firm is 23 years old and goes public at the age of 8. 
 
3.3. Profitability measures and control variables  
We measure profitability alternatively with gross margins, return on assets (ROA), and Tobin’s 
Q.  Whereas gross margins and ROA measure current profitability, Tobin’s Q reflects the 
market’s expectations about future profitability.  To account for industry-specific effects, the 
three metrics are computed as arithmetic deviations from the median industry value (based on 
two-digit SIC codes) in any given year.  When interpreting the evidence, it is important to 
remember this adjustment.  Most firms are in one industry only.  Hence, there is not much sense 
constructing sales-weighted industry benchmarks.  The results do not change when using the 48 
industry grouping suggested by Fama and French (1997).  To reduce the influence of outliers, we 
follow Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) and winsorize all variables at the 5th and 95th 
percentile of their pooled distribution across all firm-years.  This correction, however, is 
immaterial.    
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables in the analysis.  Panel A is 
dedicated to our three profitability measures.3  Panels B and C list the various control variables; 
their definitions are in Table 12 at the end of the paper.  Panel B, in particular, shows the 
variables with data available for the full sample.  Specifically, to assess financial constraints (KZ 
                                                 
3  The correlation between gross margins and ROA is 0.285; that between gross margins and Tobin’s Q is 
0.341; and that between ROA and Tobin’s Q is 0.328.  
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index), we use an index similar to that of Kaplan and Zingales (1997).  The results do not change 
when we replace that index with alternative measures, such as financial leverage or a binary 
variable that identifies dividend payers.  Our proxy for risk is the annualized standard deviation 
of the firm’s daily stock return (Volatility).  A Herfindahl index based on the sales in the firm’s 
different segments captures the degree of specialization (Focus).  Firm size (Size) is measured 
non-linearly, namely with the logged ratio of the firm’s market capitalization divided by that of 
CRSP’s NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equal-weighted index (Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008).  
Lastly, the control variables include the firm’s capital expenditures net of depreciation (Capex), 
standardized by the market value of its assets.  For reading convenience, the descriptive statistics 
refer to the unstandardized measures of firm size and capital expenditures.   
These variables, together with year dummies, form our so-called standard regression 
specification.  Descriptive statistics about the age and tenure of CEOs and directors, as well as 
data about ownership structure and corporate-governance quality are in Panel C.  These variables 
are available for only a limited subsample of firms, which is why we discuss them in a separate 
panel of the table and do not include them in the standard regression.  We examine their 
relevance later in the analysis.  Finally, Panel D shows descriptive statistics for variables used in 
our subsequent discussion about organizational inertia and rent-seeking behavior; these variables 
are also defined in Table 12.   
Table 3 computes pairwise correlation coefficients between the regression arguments.  
Except for the correlation between listing and incorporation age, which equals 0.73, most 
coefficients are fairly low.   In no case is there any concern about collinearity (listing and 
incorporation age do not appear jointly in any regression specification).   
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4. Firm age and profitability 
To assess whether there is a relation between firm age and profitability, we estimate robust panel 
regressions.  This enables us to distinguish between cohort and true aging effects.  Cross-
sectional OLS regressions are unable to make that distinction.  This could explain why, in some 
cases, OLS regressions find no relation between firm age and profitability (see, for example, 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Table 4 shows the results for the standard regression.  The Hausman specification test 
reported at the bottom of the table prefers fixed to random effects.  We therefore include firm-
fixed effects to account for firm heterogeneity, and add period-fixed effects to capture the impact 
of the overall state of the economy.  We assume that the regression coefficients are the same 
across industries and stationary over time.  We come back to this assumption.  Moreover, to 
control for a possible omitted-variable problem, in addition to the firm-fixed effects we include 
lagged profitability values in our regressions.  If age also affects past profitability, however, this 
correction makes it more difficult to find an age effect.  As it turns out, with and without 
correction, the results are qualitatively the same. 
Regressions (1) to (3) in the table are estimated for the full sample; regressions (4) to (6) 
exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999).  The evidence suggests a significant inverse 
relation between firm age and profitability, regardless of how we measure profitability.  It should 
be pointed out that, since we are controlling for firm size, this finding is unrelated to declining 
returns to scale.        
The linear age effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, irrespective of the 
profitability measure used and whether or not we include financials.  The squared effect is 
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generally positive and significant.  Profitability seems to have a convex relation with age.  We 
come back to this issue further down.   
The numbers imply that profitability deteriorates from the very beginning.  It is as if firms’ 
desire and motivation to succeed weaken very quickly.  At first sight, this seems to reject the 
existence of a life cycle of the firm.  Our sample, however, includes only listed firms.  To shed 
light on a potential life cycle, we reestimate the regressions in Table 4 for the firms with negative 
industry-adjusted profitability in the first year after listing.  Presumably, these firms are still in 
the early stages of their life cycle.  The evidence supports this conjecture, especially when 
measuring profitability with Tobin’s Q (not shown): the coefficient of Age is positive and 
significant with confidence 0.95, whereas that of Age2 is negative and significant with 
confidence 0.99.  The turning point in this hump-shaped age-profitability relation is reached 
around a listing age of 9.  Firms in the early stages of the life cycle therefore seem to get better 
with time, but eventually profitability falls.  Relatively few firms, however, exhibit below-
industry profitability at the time of their IPO (see also Fama and French, 2004).  We therefore do 
not treat this subset of firms separately in the following investigation. 
Coming back to Table 4, we find that the control variables have coefficients mostly in line 
with the predictions.  Financial constraints impair firm profitability (Lamont, Polk, and Saá-
Requejo, 2001).  In contrast, strategic focus has a positive and significant effect on Tobin’s Q.  
Unrelated diversification is therefore bad for business, consistent with the extant literature (see, 
among others, Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004).  We also find that larger firms do 
worse (see also Lang and Stulz, 2004) and so do firms with high stock volatility, which, in the 
case of gross margins and ROA, is difficult to square with a risk argument.  Higher capital 
expenditures (net of depreciation) also seem to have a negative effect on profitability.     
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The two age covariates are highly collinear and the associated variance inflation factors by 
far exceed the rule of thumb of 10, which could explain why the coefficient of Age2 is only 
borderline significant.  To get around this problem and find out more about the actual shape of 
the age-profitability relation, we follow Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and run piecewise 
linear regressions that allow for changes in the age coefficient at age 5, 10, 20, and 30, 
respectively.  Age 5 defines the first quartile of the age distribution; 10 is the median age; 20 is 
approximately the third quartile; about 10 percent of all observations are beyond age 30.  We 
therefore substitute Age and Age2 with the following variables: 
Age.1to5 =  Age if Age < 5, Age.6to10 = 0 if Age < 5; 
 = 5 if Age ≥ 5;  =  (Age – 5) if 5  Age < 10, 
    = 5 if Age ≥ 10; 
Age.11to20 = 0 if Age < 10 Age.21to30 = 0 if Age < 20 
 =  (Age–10) if 10  Age < 20;  =  (Age–20) if 20  Age < 30; 
 = 10 if Age ≥ 20;  = 10 if Age ≥ 30; 
Age.over30 = 0 if Age < 30  
 =  (Age–30) if Age ≥ 20.   
 
A firm age of 18 years, for example, would imply that Age.1to5 = 5; Age.6to10 = 5; Age.11to20 
= 8; Age.21to30 = 0; and Age.over30 = 0.   
The results are in Panel A of Table 5.  For brevity, we report only the coefficients of the 
five age covariates.  Overall, the evidence confirms a negative relation between age and 
profitability.  Interestingly, there is no evidence of a U-shaped relation—performance does not 
rebound at very old age.  The relation, however, is convex, in the sense that the negative 
marginal effect of age bottoms out over time.  According to regressions (1) and (2), the industry-
adjusted gross margin (ROA) drops by an annual 0.20 (0.15) percentage points during the first 
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ten years and by roughly 0.15 (0.10) percentage points thereafter.  Tobin’s Q (regression 3) 
behaves similarly.  The effect of age is not huge, but it is steady and it accumulates over time.  
Note that we are controlling for past performance.  If we exclude the lagged dependent variable, 
the effect of age doubles (not shown).  In that case, ROA (Tobin’s Q) drops by an annual 0.29 
percentage points (0.08) during the first five years of life.  Between ages 5 and 10, the annual 
decline is still 0.21 percentage (0.04).  Overall, during the first 20 years of life, the age effect eats 
up a sizeable 3.3 percentage points in ROA and 0.6 in Tobin’s Q.  The effect on gross margin is 
similar.  Our remaining investigation relies on piecewise linear measures of age.   
 
5. Robustness tests 
The results suggest a significant relation between firm age and profitability.  What follows 
probes the robustness of that relation.  We ask whether the results change when we measure age 
from the time of incorporation.  We also examine the importance of a possible simultaneous 
equations bias, the relevance of relistings and mergers in our definition of age, and how sensitive 
the results are to the estimation technique.  Moreover, we want to know whether the relation is 
confined to specific time periods, and whether it is driven by the presence of many small firms in 
the sample.  Unless explicitly stated, our tables report only the coefficients of the age covariates 
and their statistical significance.   
 
5.1. Incorporation age  
The results are robust to age definition.  In Panel B of Table 5, we reestimate the piecewise linear 
standard regression but measure firm age since the year of incorporation.  We choose the same 
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percentiles as possible turning points as those used for listing age; hence, we allow the relation to 
change at incorporation ages 12, 23, 45, and 88, respectively.  The message of the evidence is 
still that firm profitability weakens over time.  Since the findings for listing age and 
incorporation age are generally the same, what follows reports the results for only one age 
definition.  We choose listing age, because it is available for the full sample of firms.  
 
5.2. Simultaneous equations bias 
The results for incorporation age help us address the potential problem of simultaneous equations 
bias.  Whereas age could affect profitability, it could also be the other way around: profitability 
could affect firm survival (Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008; Jensen, 1986) and thereby 
firm age.  The problem is that this reverse effect cannot be sizable: profitability in year t of a 
firm’s life has little effect on the probability of survival until that time, especially when we 
measure age since the date of incorporation—the median incorporation age is 23.  Hence, 
simultaneous equations bias should not be of great concern.   
 
5.3. Relistings and mergers 
Another concern is relistings.  As mentioned in the data section, we ignore the fact that some 
firms relist after having gone private and classify them as newly listed companies.  In principle, 
since firms that relist are presumably doing well, our classification could make the average 
profitability of older firms look worse than it really is, which could induce the negative age 
effect we observe.  Yet only few firms in the sample relist after having gone private.  More 
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important, as we just saw, the same results obtain when age is measured from the date of 
incorporation.  Older firms are not resurrected as young firms when they relist; they maintain 
their incorporation age.  Relisting, therefore, can hardly explain our results.  
Mergers raise questions about the proper measurement of firm age, too.  In some cases, 
merged firms are treated by CRSP as new firms.  To test whether this decision assigns good 
performing firms to the cohort of young firms and makes them look better than they really are, 
we repeat the analysis and drop all the firms that list in the year of their incorporation, since 
these could be new firms that arise from a merger.  The results, however, do not change (not 
shown).  Firm age and profitability remain negatively related.    
 
5.4. Alternative specifications and estimation techniques   
So far, we have used linear panel regressions with firm and time-fixed effects, and a lagged 
dependent variable to estimate our standard regression.  To see how crucial this estimation setup 
is, we explore alternative specifications and estimation techniques.   
In untabulated regressions, we control for financial leverage, dividend payments, and R&D 
expenses.  Leverage could reduce agency costs, lower taxes, or increase the costs of financial 
distress (see, among many others, Harris and Raviv, 1991).  Dividend payments could identify 
more profitable firms (Fama and French, 2001) or financially unconstrained ones.  And R&D 
expenses are a proxy for growth opportunities (Mehran, 1995). The results do not change when 
we include these variables.  The same conclusion follows when measuring firm size with the 
book value of assets, and when defining ROA as the ratio of NOPAT or income before 
extraordinary items to book value of assets.  We also add the squared value of all control 
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variables to allow for nonlinearities. Our conclusions stand—profitability seems to deteriorate 
over time. 
Table 6 explores additional specifications and alternative estimation procedures.  First, we 
use the logged value of profitability as the dependent variable to explore the importance of 
skewness.  Second, we allow for two lagged terms of the dependent variable.  Third, we replicate 
the analysis with the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation approach, since the 
unobserved individual panel-level effects could be correlated with the lagged dependent variable.  
Finally, we estimate fixed-effect regressions with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, 
which are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence.  
Panel A in the table is dedicated to ROA, whereas Panel B deals with Tobin’s Q.  
Regardless of performance measure and estimation technique, the data yield the same 
conclusion, namely that corporate age is negatively related with profitability across the five age 
intervals.  All age coefficients are statistically significant with confidence 0.99.  
    
5.5. Different sample years and large firms 
We also ask whether the results hold across different time periods.  Table 7 shows the 
coefficients of the age covariates if we replicate our standard regression for the years 1978–1985, 
1986–1995, and 1996–2004, separately.  In the case of ROA, the coefficients are mostly negative 
and significant.  The exception is the years 1986–1995, when the first five years of post-IPO life 
are associated with higher ROA.  The age coefficients in the Tobin’s Q regressions are almost 
uniformly negative and significant, including in the years 1986–1995.  Overall, the negative age 
relation persists.  Note that there is some variation in the coefficients.  One possible reason is that 
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the correlation in question changes over time.  Another possibility is that the sample’s industry-
composition varies in time, and that the correlation differs across industries.   
The results could also be due to the presence of many small firms.  To test this conjecture, 
we repeat the estimation in Table 5 and limit the analysis to S&P 500 firms.  However, age is 
still negatively related with profitability, especially when we measure profitability with Tobin’s 
Q.  Note that this finding confirms that age effects are distinct from size effects.  
    
5.6. Industry-specific regressions 
To find out more about the relation between age and performance at the industry level, we 
replicate our standard regression with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for individual 
industries.  Table 8 shows the results when sorting firms according to the ten industry 
classification suggested by Fama and French (1997) (plus financials).  Alternative industry 
definitions yield similar results (not shown). 
The results generally confirm the negative relation between age and profitability. With the 
exception of utilities, the relation is negative and significant in each industry for at least one 
measure of profitability.  In the case of utilities, however, ROA increases over time.  One 
possible reason is that older firms have more clout with regulators.   
A possible problem with the industry breakup of the sample is the number of observations.  
To get around that problem, we reestimate our regression and measure all variables as deviations 
from their industry-specific average, divided by the industry-specific standard deviation, in each 
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particular year.  The results show a highly significant relation between age and profitability 
across all age intervals (not shown).   
 
6. Interpretation: corporate aging 
Overall, we find a significant and robust negative relation between firm age and profitability.  
The question we want to pursue is what that relation means.  We therefore inquire into the 
possible economics of why age could harm performance, in spite of the possible learning effects 
of older age.  We offer two nonexclusive hypotheses of why that could happen, namely 
organizational rigidities and rent seeking.4   
 
6.1. Organizational rigidities 
Age can have adverse effects on performance because of the organizational rigidities and inertia 
it brings about (Carroll, 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Barron, West, 
and Hannan, 1994), a phenomenon that also impairs a firm’s ability to perceive valuable signals 
(Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  The root of the problem could be the 
tendency of firms to codify their success with organizational measures, rules of conduct, and best 
practice.  This behavior helps firms focus on their core competences and raise reliability and 
accountability.  Stressing the good to prevent the bad, however, can also make it hard to 
recognize, accept, and implement change when doing so would be appropriate.  Codification is a 
slow process.  The older the firm, the more capillary and suffocating the codification can be.  If 
                                                 
4  There are other possible hypotheses we don’t consider.  One of them is the proliferation of seniority rules and 
privileges in the organization over time.  Seniority rules can provide inadequate incentives for managers to 
perform and make it more difficult for organizations to function.   
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so, age will reduce flexibility and discourage change.5  At the same time, whatever learning 
benefits the firm captures in its established lines of business probably decline over time (Agarwal 
and Gort,1996 and 2002).  If so, older firms should tend to ossify and lose their competitive 
edge.6  
If organizational rigidities make it hard for firms to keep up with the competition, we 
would expect a decrease in productive efficiency in older firms.  If so, variable costs and 
overhead expenses should increase with age.  At the same time, market share should decline, 
which means sales growth should lag behind that of the competition.  Finally, if older firms are 
truly unwilling to innovate, they should eventually engage in less research activities and invest 
less.  By implication, older firms should also tend to have antiquated machines, plants, and 
equipment.   
   To find out, we estimate individual panel regressions of costs, sales growth, R&D, and 
asset age on firm age.  The control variables and the estimation technique are those used in Table 
5.  All dependent variables are measured as deviations from the median industry value in any 
given year.  To save space, we show only the coefficients of the age covariates and their 
significance levels.   
The results are shown in Table 9.  The evidence is consistent with our predictions.  Sales 
growth slows as firms grow older.  Moreover, cost of goods sold (COGS) and overhead expenses 
go up.  Finally, R&D and investment activities decline, and fixed assets become outdated.  In the 
                                                 
5   There is a vast literature on organizational inertia.  See, among others, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) and the 
literature cited therein. 
6  Foster and Kaplan (2001) make a somewhat related argument based on the fear of making mistakes.  They 
contend that as corporations grow, they become weighted down by rules and procedures.  Fear of 
cannibalizing their own products, competing with their customers, and diluting earnings through acquisitions 
result in cultural lock-in.  Decision-making abilities, control systems, and mental models ossify, discourage 
innovation, and dampen the ability to shed uninteresting operations. 
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case of sales growth, the extant literature reports consistent results (see, for example, Evans, 
1987; Caves, 1998; Chun et al., 2008).    
The coefficients we compute are economically meaningful.  For example, if we keep all 
covariates at their median value and allow only age to vary, the numbers imply that a newly 
listed firm’s sales growth exceeds that of the industry by 16.9 percentage points.  After nine 
years, growth falls below the industry median.  The marginal effect of age is zero past age 30.  
This latter result should be interpreted with care, since fewer than 10 percent of the firms live 
longer than 30 years after their IPO.  Hence, there are relatively few observations of 
comparatively old firms, and the coefficient estimates we obtain are more easily affected by 
outliers.   
To assess the economic significance of the results, we can also compare each dependent 
variable of interest at age 30 and age 5, keeping all the control variables at their median value.  
The associated numbers are in the last column of Table 9.  All differences are highly significant 
and almost all of them are economically tangible.  For example, old firms have a ratio of cost-of-
goods-sold to sales that is 4% higher than what we observe in young firms; given a sample 
average of 65.6%, the difference would seem to be sizable.  Similarly, the difference in overhead 
as a ratio of firm value is a considerable 9.3% (the sample average ratio is 30.2%), that in sales 
growth is 11.4% lower (the sample average ratio is 8.73%), and that in research and development 
outlays as fraction of sales is 1.4% higher (compared to a sample average ratio of 5.3%).  Also 
the investment outlays are substantially lower in older firms; as a fraction of assets, they are 
11.2% lower (the average fraction in the sample is 8.1%).  Finally, firms tend to have older 
assets, but not by much (only 0.2 years).  
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We also examine whether aging is more pronounced in high-tech than in low-tech 
industries and replicate Table 5 for these two industry groups separately (not shown).  High-tech 
firms might age faster because they are more exposed to competitive threats.  To identify high- 
and low-tech industries, we sort the 2-digit SIC industries according to their average R&D-to-
assets ratio across all sample years. Low-tech industries are those with relatively low R&D-
expenses, i.e., in the first tercile of that distribution.  In contrast, we consider all industries in the 
third tercile as high-tech. The last two rows of the table compare ROA across the two 
subsamples.  Aging is similar in the two groups.  The same conclusion follows when examining 
Tobin’s Q.  Alternative definitions of high- and low-tech industries, including the classification 
in Francis and Schipper (1999) and Fama and French (1997), yield the same conclusions.  High-
tech firms might indeed be exposed to a higher risk of obsolescence, but they might also be 
comparatively better at dealing with frequent technological changes.      
 
6.2. Rent-seeking hypothesis 
An alternative, nonexclusive, hypothesis draws on Olson (1982) and his theory of collective 
action7  and can be summarized as follows.  Collective action in society is difficult to come about 
because it is costly.  Moreover, the longer the time horizon, the more frequent the opportunities 
for special interest groups, especially small ones, to come together.  These organizations for 
collective action often survive even if the good they once provided is no longer needed.  Hence, 
“stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and 
organizations for collective action over time” (p. 41).  The great majority of these special-interest 
                                                 
7  We are grateful to Michael Brennan for pointing out this possibility. 
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groups choose to redistribute income rather than to create it, as they bear the full cost of making 
society more efficient, but get only a small fraction of the resulting gains.8  In comparison, 
redistributive efforts are more beneficial even though they can make society as a whole worse 
off—distributional coalitions do not bear the full costs of getting a larger slice of the social pie, 
but they can claim the full benefit.   
Olson’s logic can be extended to firms.  Special-interest groups and coalitions are possible 
in firms as well.  Unless these groups are provided the proper incentives by effective corporate 
governance, they are formally in the same situation as distributional coalitions in society are.  
Organizing a collective good that benefits the whole firm is often less beneficial than 
appropriating income and resources—including the pursuit of a quiet life (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003).  The older the firm, the greater are the chances that these coalitions have 
formed.  If distributional coalitions survive, rent-seeking behavior will be more widespread in 
older firms.   
Some of the testable propositions that follow from the rent-seeking hypothesis are the same 
as those that follow from the organizational-rigidities hypothesis—the two hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive.  For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show that poorly governed 
managers strive to avoid difficult restructuring and expansion decisions.  Consequently, lower 
R&D expenses and investment outlays in older firms are consistent with the rent-seeking 
hypothesis as well, simply because they involve effort and risk.  The hypothesis, however, 
implies a number of additional testable propositions. 
                                                 
8  Grossman and Hart (1980) make a similar argument to explain minority shareholders’ reluctance to monitor 
management. 
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Specifically, if rent seeking is more pervasive in older firms, it must be because corporate 
governance allows it.  If we look at the governance index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003), we consequently expect the scores of older firms to be higher (high index values reflect 
poorer governance).  Moreover, we would expect larger boards in older firms, since the literature 
suggests that larger boards reflect poorer governance (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, 1998).  Larger 
boards could either favor rent seeking or be one of the ways quasi-rents are dissipated.  
Furthermore, if corporate governance is weaker in older firms, then managers should take 
advantage of it.  We therefore investigate whether CEO pay is higher in older firms.  Finally, we 
test whether the managers of older firms slow the growth in the labor force, possibly to make the 
existing jobs safer.  Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) suggest that managers care more about 
workers to buy peace with them.   
Table 10 examines these predictions.  As before, all dependent variables are measured as 
deviations from their industry median.  For example, G-Index equals the actual Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) index value for the firm minus the median index value in the company’s two-
digit SIC industry.   To avoid clutter, the table lists only the coefficients of the age covariates and 
their significance levels.   
The evidence is consistent with the rent-seeking hypothesis.  The corporate governance 
index worsens significantly with age, and board size increases,9 in agreement with an 
environment conducive to agency problems in older firms.  Field and Karpoff’s (2002) results 
that large seasoned corporations deploy defenses at a higher rate than IPO firms would seem to 
be congruent.   
                                                 
9  The literature has investigated the relation between age and board size in IPO firms with mixed results 
(Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; see, however, also Link, Netter, and Yang, 2008). 
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The evidence also confirms the existence of apparent agency problems: all other things 
being equal, total CEO compensation in real 1978 dollars goes up with age.  The annual increase 
is limited, but it accumulates to a sizable number.  For example, the first five years after the IPO 
add $9,000 to the CEO pay every year, and the next five add another $7,000.  Ignoring time 
value of money, this means that the CEO of a firm at the end of its tenth year of listing makes 
$80,000 in real terms more than his peers in the industry.  This result is robust to the inclusion of 
CEO age and tenure as additional controls in the regression (not shown).  Hence, even though 
performance slows, CEOs end up making more money as firms grow older.  The age effect in 
CEO compensation becomes even stronger when we control for profitability (not shown).  In that 
case, compared to the CEO of a newly listed firm, the CEO of a ten-year old company earns 
approximately $120,000 more. Given that the median CEO pay in the sample is $328,000 in 
1978 dollars, this age effect seems quite substantial.  
We also find that employment grows more slowly in older firms.  Combined with the 
evidence of lower R&D and investment efforts we just saw, this could reflect the quieter life that 
the managers of older firms might strive for—or their inability to keep pace with the 
competition.  We should stress that we are controlling for firm size.  Hence, the result is not the 
reflection of diminishing economies of scale.   
As before, we can gauge the economic importance of the results by comparing 30-year old 
firms with 5-year old ones.  The last column in Table 10 performs that comparison.  Governance 
quality has about two index points more in older firms.  Since the median index value in the 
sample is 9 and the minimum is 5, the difference would seem to be economically substantial.  
With almost three additional directors, board size is also larger in older firms—according to 
Table 2, the median board size is 9 and the minimum is 5.  Please remember again that these 
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findings are conditional on firm size.  Similarly, CEO pay is almost 64 thousand real 1978 
dollars higher and employment growth 11.7 percent lower.       
On the whole, the evidence supports the existence of a corporate aging phenomenon along 
the economic logic we suggested.  We should stress that, under both hypotheses, there is a causal 
relation between firm age and poorer performance.  Under the organizational-rigidities 
hypothesis, it is time itself that enables a capillary codification of processes and ideas, leads to 
ossification, and progressively weakens the ability of the firm to respond to competitive threats.  
Similarly, under the rent-seeking hypothesis, it is time that enables the coalescing of an 
increasing number of interest groups and factions within the firm.   
 
7. Alternative hypotheses 
There are several alternative hypotheses that could explain our findings.   What follows 
examines a number that were suggested to us.  We therefore inquire whether our findings are 
driven by firms in the early years after their IPO, investor uncertainty, ownership structure, 
industry age, age of management, and sample selection.   We focus our discussion on 
profitability.  
 
7.1. Is the age effect a reincarnation of post-IPO regularities? 
Jain and Kini (1994) and Fama and French (2004) report that operating profitability deteriorates 
after the IPO.  Conceivably, firms list when they think they are at the peak of performance (see, 
among others, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998; Chemmanur, He, and Nandy, 2008).  If so, it 
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should not be surprising that profitability deteriorates after the IPO.  It’s unclear, however, how 
optimal timing can explain a negative piecewise relation between age and profitability as many 
as 20 years after the IPO.  Moreover, the same results obtain when we measure age from the date 
of incorporation rather than that of listing.  We are not claiming that there is no IPO timing.  All 
we are saying is that there is more than simply IPO timing to the data, and that the evidence is 
consistent with a phenomenon of corporate aging.  In fact, the IPO effect could be an aging 
effect. 
 
7.2. Is the age effect a manifestation of declining uncertainty? 
Pástor and Veronesi (2003) argue that uncertainty about a firm’s average future profitability 
should decline over time as investors learn more about the firm.  Consistent with the model, and 
using firm age as a proxy for learning, the paper finds that younger firms have higher M/B ratios.  
At least two observations, however, cast doubts on a pure uncertainty interpretation of the age 
effect we observe.  First, the age effect is not limited to a valuation multiple but extends, as we 
have seen, to other profitability measures (ROA and margins), sales growth, cost structures, and 
investment outlays, among others.  Resolution of investor uncertainty cannot explain these 
findings.  Second, the age effect in our Tobin’s Q regressions does not disappear even though we 
control for stock-return volatility in our standard regression.  This suggests that there is more to 
the age effect than investor learning.     
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7.3. Is the age effect a manifestation of declining ownership concentration? 
The empirical literature finds a negative relation between ownership concentration and firm age.  
At the same time, ownership could correlate positively with profitability.  Conceivably, 
increasing age could simply be a proxy for declining ownership concentration. 
To find out whether this is so, we use blockholder data from Dlugosz et al. (2006) for the 
years 1996 to 2001.  There are matching data for 1,180 firms (3,992 firm-years).  Consistent with 
previous studies, we find that ownership concentration is lower in older firms (Panel A of Table 
11).  We then replicate the analysis in Table 5, extending the standard regression specification 
with the cumulative fraction of shares controlled by the firm’s officers and directors (Inside 
ownership) and its squared value.  The coefficients of the age covariates remain generally 
negative (regression 1 of Table 11B). The same conclusion follows when we control for the stake 
of the largest shareholder, the blockholders as a group, and the outside shareholders (not shown).  
Overall, therefore, it is difficult to claim that firm age is a surrogate for ownership concentration.  
At the same time, these results suggest that the decline in the quality of corporate governance we 
have observed above is a phenomenon that cannot be explained by declining ownership 
concentration alone. 
We repeat the analysis by excluding closely held firms, namely those where Inside 
ownership is larger than 20 or, alternatively, 30 percent.  This procedure should filter out a large 
proportion of family firms.  The results are unaffected, which suggests that the age-profitability 
relation is not tied to a loosening of family control over time, either (not shown).  Consistent 
with this argument, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that the log of firm age (measured since 
inception) in family firms is also negatively related to profitability. 
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In this context, we should mention the monitoring model by Clementi, Cooley, and Di 
Giannatale (2009).  The model predicts a decline in the value of entrepreneurial firms after they 
are started.  Yet the model does not seem to apply to listed firms and their performance after 
listing. 
 
7.4. Industry age 
One could argue that older firms are more likely to operate in relatively old and unattractive 
industries.  Therefore, the relation between firm age and performance could simply reflect a 
negative link between industry age and performance.  Yet our performance measures are 
industry-adjusted, so industry age cannot explain our results.  
 
7.5. Is the age effect a manifestation of older people in the organization? 
Faleye (2007) observes a negative relation between director age and Tobin’s Q.  If older firms 
are managed by older people, firm age could be a proxy for the age of managers and directors.  
To find out whether it is the age of the organization or that of its people that impairs profitability, 
we collect age and tenure data for the sample firms’ CEOs and directors.  The information is 
from RiskMetrics and ExecuComp, respectively.  We find matching data for 1,830 CEOs (11,447 
firm-years) in 1992–2004 and for 1,896 boards (8,176 firm-years) in 1996–2004. 
Panel A of Table 11 shows that the CEOs and the directors of older firms are indeed older 
themselves, although only marginally so; moreover, they have been with the company a bit 
longer.  For example, the CEO of firms older than the median is 56, on average; in younger 
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firms, he is 53.  Similarly, directors of older firms are 59, on average, whereas in younger firms 
they are 56.  We stress that these differences are fairly small.  Not surprisingly, when we include 
these variables in our standard regression from Table 5, the results do not change.  The analysis 
covers a subsample of 806 firms (2,134 firm-years) during the years 1998 to 2001.  There is a 
negative relation between director tenure and performance, but we still find an overall negative 
relation between firm age and Tobin’s Q (regressions 2, 3, and 4 of Table 11B).  The same 
conclusions follow when measuring performance with ROA (not shown).  The results remain the 
same also when adding the squared value of the CEO’s and the directors’ age, as well as the 
squared value of their tenure (not shown). 
In a related test, we wanted to know whether young CEOs are able to turn things around in 
older firms.  Hence, we repeated the standard regression in Table 5 and focused on firms where 
the CEO’s tenure is shorter than 4 years.  The results do not change.  Young CEOs alone are 
apparently unable to solve the corporate aging problem.   
 
7.6. Is the age effect an expression of sample selection? 
Survival bias could also explain our results.10  Let us illustrate this interpretation with an 
analogy.  Firms can be thought of as antelopes.  In our story, the M&A market plays the role of 
lions that feed on antelopes.  We can assume that young antelopes taste better than old ones.  
Suppose now the agility of antelopes is a random variable independent of age.  If so, the young 
antelopes that survive will tend to be more agile than the old survivors, simply because the weak 
among them, especially the young ones, will be caught and eaten by the lions.  Natural selection 
                                                 
10  We are indebted to Yakov Amihud for suggesting this interpretation. 
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will therefore induce a negative relation between agility and the age of the antelopes.  The same 
happens in the M&A market, since poor performers are less likely to survive and since young 
firms seem to be more attractive takeover targets (Loderer, Neusser, and Waelchli, 2009).  This 
more radical weeding out of poor performers in the cohort of young firms could therefore induce 
the negative relation between profitability and firm age we observe, even if unconditional firm 
profitability is unrelated to firm age.  
To discriminate between this lion hypothesis (a sample-selection hypothesis) and our claim 
that it is age itself that reduces profitability, we replicate our regressions for the firms in the 
sample with superior profitability (i.e., above the industry median in any given year).  Since lions 
supposedly feed on the weaker antelopes, they should have no or a significantly weaker effect on 
the observed mean agility of the faster antelopes.  By analogy, natural selection in the market for 
corporate control should have no direct effect on the observed mean profitability of the better 
firms.  As it turns out, our results are unchanged: there is still a strong negative relation between 
(incorporation and listing) age and performance.  Even the better among the older firms fail to 
keep up with the competition (Panel C of Table 11). 
 
8. Conclusions     
In life, almost everything gets old and obsolete.  This paper asks whether firms suffer the same 
fate and become inefficient as time goes by.  A priori, it’s unclear what one should expect.  If 
anything, aging should decrease costs because of various learning effects within the firm and 
learning spillovers from other firms in the same or in other industries.  We start by looking for a 
correlation between firm age and profitability.  What we find is a highly significant negative 
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relation, which is quite robust with respect to different estimation techniques, regression 
specifications, and the way we measure firm age.  In the second part of the investigation, we look 
into the economics of aging and offer two nonexclusive hypotheses why firms could age, namely 
organizational rigidities and rent seeking.   
The evidence is consistent with both rationales.  COGS and overhead expenses go up, 
growth slows down, and R&D expenses and capital expenditures fall behind the industry 
median, which is consistent with the existence of organizational rigidities.  Also, as predicted by 
the rent-seeking hypothesis, corporate governance worsens, boards grow, and CEO pay goes up.  
These results cannot be explained with alternative interpretations of the data.  In particular, 
corporate aging is distinct from factors such as concave investment opportunity sets, uncertainty, 
ownership structure, age of officers and directors, and industry age.     
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the existence of a real corporate aging 
problem.  As far as we know, this is the first large-scale study to address the issue of corporate 
aging in its various performance-related dimensions, and the first such study to relate that 
phenomenon to organizational rigidities and rent seeking.  Corporate aging raises many 
fascinating questions we have to leave for future research.  One avenue of further inquiry is a 
better understanding of why corporate governance is apparently unable to deal with this problem.  
A second question is what happens to obsolete firms and their resources: do they waste away or 
does the market for corporate control dispose of them (Jensen, 2000)?  Finally, a third area of 
interest is the possible existence and the determinants of a lifecycle of the corporation.       
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Table 1 
Firm age 
The table shows descriptive statistics for the age of our sample firms. Panel A reports listing age by sample years. 
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for incorporation age. 
 
Sample year Mean Median p25 p75 Max Stdev N 
        
Panel A: Listing age by sample year 
1978 – 2004 14.14 10.00 5.00 19.00 80.00 13.79 82,845 
        
1978 14.51 9.00 7.00 17.00 54.00 12.92 2,285 
1980 15.78 10.00 9.00 19.00 56.00 13.09 2,277 
1985 15.47 14.00 5.00 19.00 61.00 13.76 2,589 
1990 14.96 10.00 5.00 19.00 66.00 13.90 2,808 
1995 12.92 8.00 3.00 20.00 71.00 13.88 4,097 
2000 12.27 7.00 4.00 15.00 76.00 13.41 3,523 
2004 15.91 11.00 6.00 20.00 80.00 14.42 2,923 
        
Panel B: Incorporation age 
1978 – 2004 32.06 23.00 12.00 45.00 280.00 27.36 40,400 
Age at listing 15.32 8.00 4.00 18.00 274 19.20 5,051 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the performance measures and the control variables.  We exclude here 
firms that operate in the financial sector (SIC 6000–6999) to make our data more comparable with those of other 
studies.  All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile of their pooled distribution across all firm-years 
(Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008).  Total assets and capital expenditures (net of depreciation) are in constant 
1978 dollars.  Variable definitions are shown in Table 12.  The sample period is 1978 – 2004. 
 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Stdev N 
       
Panel A: Profitability measures 
Unadjusted Gross margin  34.383  31.376  7.647  73.565  18.125  76,188 
Unadjusted ROA  12.211  12.509  –8.274  29.325  9.286  74,747 
Unadjusted Tobin’s Q  1.591  1.270  0.780  4.050  0.858  75,344 
       
Panel B: Control variables (full sample) 
KZ index   –2.449  –0.403  –20.158  2.870  5.711  61,397 
Volatility  0.643  0.564  0.238  1.435  0.326  73,271 
Focus  0.848  1.000  0.113  1.000  0.237  76,201 
Size  –10.530  –10.578  –14.436  –6.303  1.737  75,364 
Capex  –0.030  –0.025  –0.233  0.140  0.093  72,081 
Total assets  562.621  76.719  0.317  127,064.0  2,664.286  76,199 
Capital expenditures   14.221  1.447  –15.822  120.330  32.338  71,370 
       
Panel C: Control variables (reduced sample) 
CEO age  55.211  55.000  43.000  68.000  6.864  10,601 
CEO tenure  7.663  6.000  1.000  23.000  6.045  9,979 
Director age  58.440  58.778  50.500  65.167  3.927  7,589 
Director tenure  9.265  8.833  3.600  17.300  3.745  5,837 
Inside ownership  3.423  0.000  0.000  24.500  6.942  3,958 
       
Panel D: Variables to investigate organizational rigidities and the rent-seeking  
Asset age  4.691  4.124  1.015  10.871  2.728  59,298 
Board size  8.836  9.000  5.000  13.000  2.278  7,589 
CEO pay  414.846  329.073  105.279  1,133.230  278.586  11,021 
COGS  0.656  0.686  0.264  0.924  0.181  76,188 
Employment growth  0.065  0.027  -0.275  0.591  0.205  61,561 
G-Index  9.065  9.000  5.000  14.000  2.582  11,835 
Investment outlays  0.081  0.057  -0.130  0.393  0.126  62,558 
Overhead  0.302  0.188  0.000  1.226  0.332  75,377 
Sales growth (%)  8.732  4.980  -25.974  63.258  21.669  64,581 
Sales-to-assets  1.271  1.162  0.216  3.011  0.749  76,199 
R&D expenses  0.053  0.020  0.000  0.245  0.070  39,125 
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Table 3 
Correlation coefficients between regression arguments 
The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients between pairs of regression arguments.  The sample period is  
1978 – 2004. 
 
 Age Ageinc KZ index 
Vola. Focus Size Capex CEO age CEO 
tenure 
Dir. age Dir. 
tenure 
Ageinc 0.734           
KZ index –0.026 –0.009          
Volatility –0.388 –0.425 –0.021         
Focus –0.331 –0.291 –0.023 0.211        
Size 0.281 0.166 –0.109 –0.293 –0.152       
Capex 0.130 0.141 0.377 –0.199 0.062 –0.096      
CEO age 0.187 0.158 0.026 –0.171 –0.079 0.040 0.057     
CEO tenure –0.102 –0.094 –0.033 –0.012 0.010 –0.009 0.024 0.369    
Director age 0.337 0.292 0.032 –0.239 –0.154 0.056 0.153 0.408 0.084   
Director ten. 0.184 0.220 –0.041 –0.167 –0.063 –0.002 0.008 0.198 0.350 0.404  
Inside own. –0.208 –0.172 –0.009 0.008 0.119 –0.211 –0.010 0.037 0.251 –0.090 0.207 
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Table 4 
Firm age and profitability 
The table investigates the relation between listing age and firm profitability.  Variable definitions are in Table 12. 
Profitability is measured with gross margin, return on assets (ROA), and Tobin’s Q.  All measures are adjusted for 
industry effects by subtracting the profitability of the median firm in the industry, defined with two-digit SIC codes.  
We use panel regressions with fixed effects and robust standard errors.  The overall state of the economy is captured 
with period fixed effects (year dummies). Regressions (1) to (3) are estimated for the full sample.  Regressions (4), 
to (6) exclude financials (SIC codes 6000–6999).  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The symbols 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The years under 
investigation are 1978 to 2004. 
 
 Full sample Nonfinancial firms 
 Gross margin ROA Tobin’s Q Gross margin ROA Tobin’s Q 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
       
Age  –0.196 ***  –0.114 ***  –0.015 ***  –0.204 ***  –0.115 ***  –0.015 *** 
  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.001)  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.001) 
Age2 / 100  0.055 *  0.028  0.005 **  0.057 *  0.033 *  0.005 *** 
  (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.002)  (0.030)  (0.020)  (0.002) 
KZ index  –0.183 ***  –0.314 ***  –0.015 ***  –0.178 ***  –0.309 ***  –0.015 *** 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.001)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.001) 
Volatility  –2.273 ***  –4.382 ***  –0.314 ***  –2.311 ***  –4.384 ***  –0.308 *** 
  (0.209)  (0.179)  (0.015)  (0.222)  (0.187)  (0.016) 
Focus  1.542 ***  0.381 *  0.050 **  1.619 ***  0.374  0.046 ** 
  (0.334)  (0.224)  (0.020)  (0.348)  (0.233)  (0.021) 
Sizet-1  –0.162 **  –0.588 ***  –0.141 ***  –0.174 ***  –0.590 ***  –0.140 *** 
  (0.064)  (0.049)  (0.005)  (0.067)  (0.051)  (0.006) 
Capex  –5.994 ***  –9.943 ***  –1.066 ***  –6.149 ***  –9.761 ***  –1.067 *** 
  (0.694)  (0.565)  (0.056)  (0.733)  (0.591)  (0.057) 
Gross margin t-1  0.525 ***    0.522 ***   
  (0.011)    (0.012)   
ROAt-1   0.413 ***    0.411 ***  
   (0.007)    (0.007)  
Tobin’s Qt-1    0.517 ***    0.517 *** 
    (0.008)    (0.008) 
Constant  0.885  –3.662 ***  –1.140 ***  0.868  –3.634 ***  –1.122 *** 
  (0.738)  (0.538)  (0.057)  (0.772)  (0.560)  (0.059) 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
       
Observations  64,724  64,662  64,740  59,769  59,704  59,768 
R2  0.330  0.259  0.287  0.327  0.256  0.290 
F-Test  193.79 ***  292.69 ***  215.54 ***  169.63 ***  260.05 ***  199.79 *** 
Hausmann test (2)  10,894 ***  10,312 ***  7,038 ***  10,084 ***  9,419 ***  6,630 *** 
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Table 5 
Piecewise linear regressions  
The table inquires into the shape of the age-profitability relation with piecewise linear regressions. Panel A measures 
age since listing. The age covariates are Age.1to5, Age.6to10, Age.11to20, Age.21to30, and Age.over30.  Firm age of 
18 years, for example, implies that Age.1to5=5; Age.6to10=5; Age.11to20=8; Age.21to30=0; Age.over30=0.  Panel 
B looks at incorporation age, where the age covariates are Ageinc.1to12, Ageinc.13to23, Ageinc.24to45, Ageinc.46to88, 
and Ageinc.over88, respectively.  The control variables and the estimation techniques are those from Table 5. To save 
space, we report only the coefficients of the age variables and the associated significance levels.  Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  The dependent variables are Gross margin (regression 1), ROA (regression 2), 
and Tobin’s Q (regression 3).  All are measured as deviations from the industry median.  The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1978 – 
2004. 
 
Panel A: Age = Listing age 
 
 Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 
      
(1) Gross margin (%)  –0.203 ***  –0.220 ***  –0.174 ***  –0.157 ***  –0.142 *** 
  (0.052)  (0.032)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.020) 
(2) ROA (%)  –0.141 ***  –0.153 ***  –0.080 ***  –0.106 ***  –0.087 *** 
  (0.045)  (0.027)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
(3) Tobin’s Q  –0.024 ***  –0.021 ***  –0.007 ***  –0.016 ***  –0.010 *** 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
      
 
 
Panel B: Age = Incorporation age 
 
 Ageinc.1to12 Ageinc.13to23 Ageinc.24to45 Ageinc.46to88 Ageinc.over88 
      
(1) Gross margin (%)  –0.198 ***  –0.186 ***  –0.150 ***  –0.119 ***  –0.143 *** 
  (0.053)  (0.036)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.034) 
(2) ROA (%)  –0.146 ***  –0.095 ***  –0.110 ***  –0.090 ***  –0.100 *** 
  (0.045)  (0.031)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.026) 
(3) Tobin’s Q  –0.019 ***  –0.015 ***  –0.012 ***  –0.012 ***  –0.011 *** 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
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Table 6 
Alternative estimation techniques 
The tables presents the coefficient estimates of the age covariates in a piecewise linear context and various 
estimation techniques.  The basic regression specification is our standard one from Table 5.  Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  The dependent variables are ROA (Panel A) and Tobin’s Q (Panel B).  All are measured 
as deviations from the industry median.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with confidence 
0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1978 – 2004. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: ROA   
 Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 
      
Logged ROA (industry-adjusted)  –0.135 ***  –0.145 ***  –0.071 ***  –0.098 ***  –0.079 *** 
  (0.043)  (0.026)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.013) 
      
Panel regressions with  two lagged 
dependent variables 
 –0.190 ***  –0.163 ***  –0.081 ***  –0.102 ***  –0.088 *** 
 (0.067)  (0.030)  (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) 
      
Arellano-Bond estimation (two 
lags) 
 –0.372  ***  –0.384 ***  –0.190 ***  –0.180 ***  –0.267 *** 
(0.082) (0.046)  (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) 
      
Panel regressions with with 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
 –0.271 ***  –0.282 ***  –0.210 ***  –0.236 ***  –0.217 *** 
 (0.051)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.033)  (0.038) 
      
 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
 Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 
      
Logged Tobin’s Q  
(industry-adjusted) 
 –0.014 ***  –0.011 ***  –0.006 ***  –0.010 ***  –0.007 *** 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
      
Panel regressions with  two lagged 
dependent variables 
 –0.019 ***  –0.021 ***  –0.010 ***  –0.018 ***  –0.013 *** 
 (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
      
Arellano-Bond estimation (two 
lags) 
–0.024***  –0.033 ***  –0.009 ***  –0.026 ***  –0.037 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Panel regressions with with 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
 –0.064 ***  –0.061 ***  –0.047 ***  –0.056 ***  –0.050 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
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Table 7 
Robustness check of the relation between firm age and profitability 
The table replicates the regressions of Table 5 for subperiods of the sample years, when focusing on the firms in the 
S&P 500 index, and when focusing on firms that have been incorporated for at least five years before listing.  For 
brevity, we report only the coefficients of the age covariates and the associated significance levels.  The dependent 
variables are ROA (Panel A) and Tobin’s Q (Panel B).  All are measured as deviations from the industry median.  
The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The 
sample period is 1978 – 2004.   
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: ROA  
 Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 
      
1978–1985  –0.498 ***  –0.302 ***  –0.172 ***  –0.090   0.038 
 (0.043)  (0.026)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.013) 
      
1986–1995  0.191 ***  0.004  –0.005  –0.026 ***  0.001 
 (0.031)  (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
      
1996–2004  –0.138 *  –0.281 ***  –0.171 ***  –0.362 ***  –0.272 *** 
 (0.082)  (0.053)  (0.050) (0.066) (0.048) 
      
S&P 500  –0.598  *  –0.243   –0.191 ***  –0.030   –0.026  
(0.082) (0.046)  (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) 
      
 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q  
 Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 
      
1978–1985  –0.096 ***  –0.039 ***  –0.003   –0.009 *  –0.010 *** 
 (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
      
1986–1995  –0.014 **  –0.003   0.002   –0.012 ***  –0.011 *** 
 (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
      
1996–2004  –0.069 ***  –0.042 ***  –0.013 ***  –0.034 ***  –0.033 *** 
 (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
      
S&P 500  –0.103  **  –0.005   –0.029 ***  –0.014 ***  –0.014 *** 
(0.043) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
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Table 8 
The relation between age and profitability across industries 
The table replicates the regressions of Table 5 with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for individual 
industries. We group the sample firms into the ten Fama-French (1997) industries. In addition, we examine 
Financials (SIC 6000–6999). For brevity, we report only the coefficients of the age covariates and the associated 
significance levels.  The dependent variables are ROA (Panel A) and Tobin’s Q (Panel B).  The symbols ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1978 
– 2004.   
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: ROA  
Industry Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 
      
Consumer nondurables  –0.357 ***  –0.136  –0.010  –0.005  –0.095 
Consumer durables  –0.385 *  0.098  –0.249 **  –0.027  –0.147 
Manufacturing  –0.057  0.014  0.102  0.044  0.070 
Energy  –0.283 *  0.204  0.052  0.186  0.053 
High tech  –0.194 **  –0.364 ***  –0.222 ***  –0.311 ***  –0.179 *** 
Telecom  0.002  –0.354 *  –0.206 *  –0.311 **  –0.217 ** 
Shops  –0.133  –0.011  0.071  0.031  –0.007 
Healthcare  –0.629 ***  –0.348 ***  –0.214 **  0.005  –0.176 *** 
Utilities  –0.265  0.483 ***  0.094  0.251 **  0.255 *** 
Others  0.043  –0.118  –0.012  0.073  0.026 
Financials  –0.213  –0.303 ***  –0.156 ***  –0.223 ***  –0.210 ** 
      
 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q  
Industry Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 
      
Consumer nondurables  –0.047 ***  –0.009  –0.011  –0.013 **  –0.009 
Consumer durables  –0.066 ***  –0.019  –0.009  –0.004  –0.013 
Manufacturing  –0.049 ***  –0.018 **  –0.013  –0.022 ***  –0.014 * 
Energy  –0.075 ***  –0.049 ***  –0.008  –0.040 **  –0.009 
High tech  –0.024 *  –0.011  0.001  –0.011 ***  0.003 
Telecom  0.016  –0.023  0.012  –0.016 *  –0.016 *** 
Shops  –0.056 ***  –0.059 ***  –0.027 ***  –0.031 ***  –0.031 *** 
Healthcare  –0.065 ***  –0.004  0.009 *  –0.002  0.016 ** 
Utilities  0.016  –0.016  0.004  –0.003  –0.003 
Others  –0.054 ***  –0.035 ***  –0.018 **  –0.026 ***  –0.025 *** 
Financials  –0.001  –0.009  0.009 ***  –0.019 ***  –0.007 
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Table 9 
Organizational rigidities 
The table tests the organizational rigidities hypothesis of corporate aging.  The control variables and the estimation 
techniques are those from Table 5.  To save space, we report only the coefficients of the age covariates and the 
associated significance levels.  The dependent variables are COGS (regression 1), Overhead (regression 2), Sales 
growth (regression 3), R&D expenses (regression 4), Investment outlays (regression 5), Asset age (regression 6), 
ROA of high-tech firms (regression 7), and ROA of low-tech firms (regression 8), respectively.  All these variables 
are defined in Table 12 and expressed as deviations from the industry median.  The last column in the table performs 
a comparison of the various dependent variables in 30-year versus 5-year firms, keeping the control variables at their 
industry median.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, 
respectively.  The sample period is 1978 – 2004. 
 
 Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 Marginal effect 
       
(1) COGS a)  0.191 ***  0.190 ***  0.165 ***  0.147 ***  0.135 ***  4.070 
  (0.051)  (0.032)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.019)  
(2) Overhead a)   1.056 ***  0.632 ***  0.248 ***  0.366 ***  0.250 ***  9.300 
  (0.125)  (0.082)  (0.050)  (0.059)  (0.046)  
(3) Sales growth (%)  –3.083 ***  –1.180 ***  –0.324 ***  –0.230 ***  –0.041  –11.440 
  (0.255)  (0.100)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.045)  
(4) R&D expenses a)  –0.084 ***  –0.044 **  –0.031 ***  –0.040 ***  –0.031 ***  –0.930 
  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
(5) Investment outlays a)  –1.423 ***  –0.603 ***  –0.126 ***  0.024  0.179 ***  –4.035 
  (0.137)  (0.057)  (0.033)  (0.037)  (0.028)  
(6) Asset age  0.032 **  –0.006   0.013 **  0.011 *  0.017 ***  0.210 
  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
(7) ROA high-tech firms (%)  –0.067  –0.125 *  –0.172 ***  –0.042  –0.112 **  –2.765 
  (0.100)  (0.069)  (0.043)  (0.054)  (0.050)  
(8) ROA low-tech firms (%)  –0.239 **  –0.106 *  –0.083 **  –0.141 ***  –0.107 ***  –2.770 
  (0.095)  (0.060)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.029)  
       
a) For reading convenience, we multiply the coefficients and their standard errors by 100 
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Table 10 
Rent seeking 
The table tests the rent-seeking hypothesis of corporate aging.  The control variables and the estimation techniques 
are those from Table 5.  To save space, we report only the coefficients of the age covariates and the associated 
significance levels.  The dependent variables are G-Index (regression 1), Board size (regression 2), CEO pay 
(regression 3), Employment growth (regression 4), respectively, all defined in Table 12 and expressed as deviations 
from the industry median.  The last column in the table performs a comparison of the various dependent variables in 
30-year versus 5-year firms, keeping the control variables at their industry median.  The symbols ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance with confidence 0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1978 – 
2004. 
 
 Age.1to5 Age.6to10 Age.11to20 Age.21to30 Age.over30 Marginal effect 
       
(1) G-Index  0.027  0.088 ***  0.078 ***  0.060 ***  0.054 ***  1.820 
  (0.069)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
(2) Board size  0.175  0.138 ***  0.123 ***  0.076 ***  0.006  2.680 
  (0.136)  (0.032)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.018)  
(3) CEO pay  9.075 *  7.353 ***  3.399  –0.716  5.074 ***  63.595 
  (4.969)  (2.793)  (2.098)  (2.471)  (1.910)  
(4) Employment growth (%)  –3.386 ***  –1.283 ***  –0.359 ***  –0.168 ***  0.003  –11.685 
  (0.262)  (0.105)  (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.044)  
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Table 11 
 Test of alternative interpretations 
The table tests alternative interpretations of the observed relation between firm age and profitability.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 12.  Panel A displays descriptive statistics for the firms’ ownership structure, the age and 
tenure of their CEOs and directors, and their score on the corporate governance index from Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003).  The first column shows average values of these new variables for the younger firms in the sample 
(listing age < industry median).  The second column shows average values for the older firms (listing age > industry 
median).  The third column tests for differences.  Note that a high governance index value means weaker 
shareholder rights.  Panel B tests whether ownership concentration and age or tenure of the firm’s CEO (or those of 
its directors) drive the observed relation between firm age and profitability.  The control variables and the estimation 
techniques are those from Table 5. The additional control variables are Inside ownership, CEO age, CEO tenure, 
Director age, and Director tenure.  For brevity, we do not report the coefficients of the other control variables.  
Panel C tests the sample selection hypothesis by re-estimating our standard regression from Table 5 for firms with 
superior performance.  In column (1) and (2), we include only firms with ROA above the industry median.  
Similarly, in columns (3) and (4) we include only firms with Tobin’s Q above the industry median.  We report only 
the coefficients of the age covariates.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with confidence 
0.99, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively.  The sample period is 1978 – 2004. 
 
Panel A: Ownership structure and CEO and director age 
 Listing Age < Industry 
Median 
Listing Age > Industry 
Median 
t-Test 
    
Inside ownership  4.368  3.304  –3.838 *** 
    
CEO age  52.71  56.42  –23.729 *** 
CEO tenure  7.35  8.52  –7.501 *** 
Director age  55.98  59.24  –30.726 *** 
Director tenure  8.59  10.77  –2.546 ** 
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Table 11—Continued 
 
Panel B: Test of the importance of the ownership structure and the age of people in the organization  
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Age.1to5 –0.107 -0.123 -0.119 –0.135 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.127) (0.128) 
Age.6to10 –0.071*** -0.072*** -0.083*** –0.082*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) 
Age.11to20 –0.052* -0.050* -0.058** –0.057* 
 (0.03) (0.030) (0.030) (0.03) 
Age.21to30 –0.055** -0.052* -0.051* –0.051* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Age.over30 –0.086*** -0.085*** -0.085*** –0.084***
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Inside ownership  0.010 0.008 0.011 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Inside ownership2  -0.0004 -0.0003 –0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO age  -0.005  –0.007 t 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
CEO tenure  0.018***  0.019*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Director age   0.015 0.019 
   (0.016) (0.016) 
Director tenure   0.01 0.004 
   (0.017) (0.017) 
     
Remaining control 
variables 
 Included  Included  Included  Included  
Number of firm-years  2,134  2,134  2,134  2,134 
 
 
Panel C: Test of sample selection  
 Age = Listing age  Age = Incorporation age 
 ROA (%) Tobin’s Q  ROA (%) Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Age.1to5  –0.201 ***  –0.034 *** Ageinc.1to12  –0.170 ***  –0.017 *** 
  (0.041)  (0.007)   (0.039)  (0.006) 
Age.6to10  –0.076 ***  –0.013 *** Ageinc.13to23  –0.080 ***  –0.010 ** 
  (0.027)  (0.004)   (0.027)  (0.004) 
Age.11to20  –0.064 ***  0.001 Ageinc.24to45  –0.075 ***  –0.004 
  (0.016)  (0.002)   (0.019)  (0.003) 
Age.21to30  –0.086 ***  –0.011 *** Ageinc.46to88  –0.088 ***  –0.006 ** 
  (0.018)  (0.003)   (0.017)  (0.003) 
Age.over30  –0.060 ***  –0.002 Ageinc.over88  –0.077 ***  –0.009 *** 
  (0.015)  (0.003)   (0.021)  (0.003) 
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Table 12 
Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Age Age is computed as one plus the difference between the year under investigation and the 
firm’s year of birth.  The year of birth is computed as the minimum value of: (a) the first 
year the firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (b) the first year the firm appears on the 
COMPUSTAT tapes; and (c) the first year for which we find a link between the CRSP and 
the COMPUSTAT tapes (based on COMPUSTAT data item LINKDT).  For a subsample 
of randomly selected firms, we also compute age as the number of years (plus one) since 
incorporation. This information is from Mergent Webreports. 
Asset age We follow Chun et al. (2008) and approximate the age of the firm’s assets as the ratio of 
aggregate depreciation in the balance sheet (DATA7 – DATA8) divided by the item 
“depreciation and amortization” in the income statement (DATA14).  To account for 
industry-specific effects, we measure asset age as the absolute deviation from the industry 
median (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT.  
Board size The number of directors who serve on the firm’s board.  To account for industry-specific 
effects, we measure Board size as the deviation from the industry median (based on two-
digit SIC codes) in any given year.  The data are from Risk Metrics. 
Capex The ratio of capital expenses (DATA178) net of depreciation and amortization charges 
(DATA14) to the market value of assets.  The market value of the assets is approximated 
by the book value of assets (DATA6) minus the book value of common equity (DATA60) 
plus the market value of common equity (DATA25DATA199).  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
CEO age The age of the firm’s CEO, measured in years.  The information is from RiskMetrics for a 
subsample of 1,830 firms for the years 1992 to 2004 (11,447 firm-years).  
CEO pay The CEO’s total compensation, measured in thousands of 1978 U.S. dollars. The data are 
from the annual files of COMPUSTAT Executive Compensation. 
CEO tenure The number of years the CEO has been in office.  The information is from RiskMetrics for 
a subsample of 1,830 firms for the years 1992 to 2004 (11,447 firm-years). 
COGS The firm’s COGS-to-sales ratio, defined as the cost of goods sold (DATA41) divided by 
net sales (DATA12).  To account for industry-specific effects, we measure COGS as the 
deviation from the industry median (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year.  The 
data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Director age The average age of the firm’s directors, measured in years.  The information is from 
ExecuComp for a subsample of 1,896 firms for the years 1996 to 2004 (8,176 firm-years).   
Director tenure The average tenure of the firm’s directors, measured in years.  The information is from 
ExecuComp for a subsample of 1,896 firms for the years 1996 to 2004 (8,176 firm-years).   
Employment growth The change in the number of employees (DATA29) in relation to the previous year. To 
account for industry-specific effects, we measure employment growth as the absolute 
deviation from the industry median (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year.  The 
data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Focus The Herfindahl index, HE, captures the degree of specialization based on the sales in the 
firm’s different segments, as reported on the COMPUSTAT Segment tapes:  
N 2
E ii 1
H p  , 
where N is the number of segments, the subscript i identifies the segments, and pi is the 
fraction of the firm’s total sales in the segment in question.  
G-Index The firm’s score on the governance index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  The 
index is provided on a bi- or triannual basis.  To increase sample size, we interpolate the 
index for missing sample years.  This yields a matching sample of 2,113 firms for the years 
1990 to 2004 (12,690 firm-years). 
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Table 12—Continued 
 
Variable Definition 
Gross margin The gross profit margin, defined as net sales minus cost of goods sold (DATA12–
DATA41), divided by net sales (DATA12).  To account for industry-specific effects, we 
measure the gross margin as the deviation from the industry median (based on two-digit 
SIC codes) in any given year.  The data are from COMPUSTAT.  
Inside ownership The cumulative fraction of shares controlled by the firm’s officers and directors.  This 
information is from Dlugosz et al. (2006) for a subsample of 1,242 firms for the years 1996 
to 2001 (4,272 firm-years). 
Investment outlays The firm’s investment (DATA7+DATA3) divided by the book value of assets at the end 
of the previous year (DATA6-1). To account for industry-specific effects, we measure this 
investment-to-asset ratio as the deviation from the industry median (based on two-digit SIC 
codes) in any given year.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
KZ index The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index that measures a firm’s level of financial constraints.  
We follow Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001, p. 552) and compute the KZ index as: 
–1.001909[(DATA18+DATA14)/DATA8t-1] + 0.2826389[(DATA6+MV Equity–
DATA60–DATA74)/DATA6] + 3.139193[(DATA9+DATA34)/(DATA9+DATA34+
DATA216)] – 39.3678[(DATA21+DATA19)/DATA8t-1] – 1.314759[DATA1/ 
DATA8t-1].   
Overhead The firm’s overhead expenses (DATA189), standardized by the market value of its assets.  
To account for industry-specific effects, we measure overhead as the deviation from the 
industry median (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
R&D expenses The firm’s R&D expenses (DATA46) divided by its sales (DATA12). To account for 
industry-specific effects, we measure this ratio as the deviation from the industry median 
(based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year.  The data are from COMPUSTAT.   
ROA We follow Skinner (2008), among others, and measure return on assets as the ratio of the 
firm’s operating income before depreciation (DATA13) divided by the book value of total 
assets (DATA6).  To account for industry-specific effects, we measure ROA as the 
absolute deviation from the industry median (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given 
year.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Sales growth The change in net sales (DATA12, expressed in constant 1978 USD) in relation to the 
previous year. To account for industry-specific effects, we measure sales growth as the 
absolute deviation from the industry median (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given 
year.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Sales-to-assets The firm’s sales-to-assets ratio (DATA12/DATA6). To account for industry-specific 
effects, we measure the sales-to-assets ratio as the deviation from the median industry 
value (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year.  The data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Size The log of the ratio of the firm’s market capitalization (DATA25 DATA199) to that of 
CRSP’s NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equal-weighted index.  The data are from CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q, computed as the market value of the firm’s assets divided by their book value.  
To account for industry-specific effects, we measure Tobin’s Q as absolute deviation from 
the industry median (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year.  The data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Volatility The annualized volatility of the firm’s daily stock return.  We calculate the volatility over a 
one-year window and include all firm-years with at least 100 daily returns.  The data are 
from the daily CRSP tapes. 
 
 
 
